POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MIGRANTS IN GERMANY

FRAUK MIERA

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EMILIE - A European approach to multicultural citizenship: Legal, political and educational challenges. EMILIE is a three-year research project funded by the European Commission Research DG, Sixth Framework Programme (2006-2009).
EMILIE
A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship.
Legal, Political and Educational Challenges

EMILIE examines the migration and integration experiences of nine EU Member States and attempts to respond to the so-called ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ currently affecting Europe. EMILIE studies the challenges posed by migration-related diversity in three important areas: Education; Discrimination in the workplace; Voting rights and civic participation, in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Spain and the UK. EMILIE aims to track the relationship between post-immigration diversity and citizenship, i.e. multicultural citizenship, across these EU countries, and to identify what kind(s) of, if any, multicultural citizenship is emerging and whether there is/are distinctive European pattern(s). EMILIE Project Reports, Events and Research Briefs are available at http://emilie.eliamep.gr

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is the coordinating institution of the EMILIE consortium. EMILIE Partners include the University of Bristol, the University of Aarhus, the University of Liege, the Centre for International Relations (CMR) in Warsaw, the Latvian Centre for Human Rights, the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, the European University Viadrina, in Frankfurt a.O., the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) in Paris.

The European University Viadrina (EUV) is situated in Frankfurt (Oder) in Germany. In 1991 the historical university (1506-1811) was re-established as the EUV. It is comprised of three faculties: the Faculty of Social and Cultural Sciences, the Faculty of Law, and the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. The location of the EUV, next to the Polish border, signifies its transnational character. The university has established an international profile with its research programs and multiple co-operations, as well as attracting students from throughout Europe through its excellent standard of education.

The EMILIE-project is affiliated with the Institute of Cultural and Social Anthropology chaired by Prof Dr Werner Schiffauer. The Faculty of Cultural Sciences, of which the Institute of Cultural and Social Anthropology is a part, emphasizes a transdisciplinary approach. The faculty aspires to transcend the traditional boundaries between the humanities and social sciences, and to pursue cooperations with the two other EUV faculties. The Institute of Cultural and Social Anthropology welcomes the challenge to rethink its foundations in this context, enabling participation in this transdisciplinary dialogue. This is done with regard to ethnographic fields, methods, and empirical concepts, and is put into practice by concentrating on the development of an anthropology of late industrial/modern society. Special emphasis within this context is put on anthropology of migration and anthropology of media. For more information see http://www.kuwi.euv-frankfurt-o.de/en/index.html.

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Introduction

This paper aims to analyse the way the political participation of migrants and their descendants is perceived, and how migrants actually take part in political life in Germany in practice. This includes an analysis of the opportunity structures of political participation, meaning the concrete regulation of voting rights and involvement in decision-making processes as well as the discourse behind these regulations of political inclusion and exclusion.

Political participation is traditionally understood as involving the formalised participation in elections, the active involvement in political parties, and up to standing for election. For two reasons we will refer to a broader understanding of political participation, including the involvement in institutionalised round tables, consultation and in civil society. One reason for this approach is a general understanding of the political as being a complex process in which elections and standing up for elections is only one important part. Beyond that it is crucial to ask if and how migrants play a role in setting political agendas and whether and in what way migrants are involved in decision-making processes. Second, since in Germany citizenship rights – and therefore voting rights – have been restrictive for decades, even after the amendment of the Citizenship Law in 1999 there is a significant number of immigrants without German citizenship. Hence, in order to include non-citizens into the analysis, other forms of political participation have to be taken into consideration.

The vast exclusion of migrants as foreigners from formal political rights in Germany is also reflected in literature on migrants’ participation. Various publications on this subject focus on the role of migrant self-organisation or civic participation; others expound the problems of missing citizenship rights (e.g. BAGIV 1999; Diehl 2002; Assimenios, S. and Shajanian, Y. 2001; see also Cyrus 2005). It is only been the last couple of years that an increasing number of migrants with German citizenship and their voting behaviour has been the subject of empirical research (Wüst 2002, 2003, 2006; Fonseca 2006a, 2006b).

In addition to secondary literature this study is based on the analysis of material published by political parties, governmental institutions, and organisations, as well as on interviews conducted with six experts – in particular the representatives of the parliamentary parties in charge of migrant/integration issues or their consultants (Liberal Democratic Party (FDP),
First, we will refer to the basic provisions of political participation, which is the right to vote and stand for election on the national and local levels. Studies on the political interest and voter participation of migrants will give a glimpse into both the disillusioning effects political and social exclusion have had on migrants, as well as the potential of political voices in society that has so far remained untapped. In the second part, we will outline institutionalised forms of participation and consultation, such as Foreign Citizens’ Advisory Councils originating from the 1960s and 1970s (which are meanwhile partly being transformed into Integration Councils), as well as the governmental initiative from 2006, the National Integration Summit. Third, we will focus on civic commitment in organisations as a form of articulating political opinion beyond voting and institutionalised consultation. Finally, we will focus on the position of migrants as members of political parties, candidates for elections and elected deputies.

1 Franchise and voting

German citizenship is required for the right to vote or candidate in national elections. Franchise on the municipal level is additionally given to EU-citizens. In the following we will outline the legal development of citizenship rights as well as the debates around national and local franchise. Generally, the Citizenship Law from 2000 is considered a “milestone” in German integration policies (e.g. Palmowski 2008) symbolising a qualitative step from ignoring to acknowledging the immigration situation. Koopmans et al. (2005: 72) testify that Germany’s immigration policies have made a shift from the model of ethnic assimilationism towards cultural pluralism and towards a more civic-territorial conception of citizenship. We will argue that the governmental efforts to improve and foster integration in recent years have underexposed the aim of political representation and participation of migrants and their descendants. Despite the decisive liberalisation of citizenship regulations and even naturalisation campaigns there are still quite restrictive elements which foremost affect migrants from Turkey or more generally from Muslim countries.

1.1 The Citizenship Law and its Relevance for (Muslim) Migrants

Up until the year 2000 German citizenship – with the exception of naturalisation – had only been based on German descent following the principle of the ius sanguinis according to the Law of the German Reich from 1913. According to this law so-called ethnic Germans ((Spät-)Aussiedler) acquired German citizenship as soon as their (Spät-)Aussiedler-status had been confirmed. On the other hand, so-called ‘guest workers’ and refugees who had been living in Germany for several years were not eligible to naturalisation, and even children and grandchildren of long term immigrants who were born in Germany remained legally defined as

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1 Interviews with representatives of the parliamentary fraction of the Conservative Party and of the Left Party (LINKE/PDS) were several times scheduled but unfortunately cancelled in the end.
foreigners’. This referred especially to non-EU-citizens who had immense difficulties to consolidate their residence permit and to fulfil the fairly restrictive naturalisation requirements. In 1977 the Federal Republic of Germany was declared not to be an immigration country and therefore did not intend to increase the numbers of ‘foreign’ citizens being naturalised. This attitude has slowly changed since 1998, when the coalition of Social Democrats and Green Party came into power. The new government announced a fundamental revision of the citizenship law, introducing the *ius soli*, meaning that the place of birth is also relevant to German citizenship, as well as the option of double or multiple-citizenship. During the Hesse Land election campaign, the Conservative Party launched a massive xenophobic campaign against these proposals, whereupon the government withdrew core elements of the bill. According to the Citizenship Law, finally passed in 1999, children of foreigners acquire German citizenship if one parent has been legally living in Germany for at least eight years. These children are then allowed to hold a double passport until the age of 23, after which they have to opt for either the German or the other citizenship. Stipulations regarding the confirmation of German citizenship to *(Spät-)*Aussiedler remain valid. While the principle of *ius soli* has been introduced only partly, the principle of *ius sanguinis* is still crucial to German Citizenship Law.

Requirements for naturalisations are: a length of legal stay in Germany of 7/8 years (reduced from 15 years), a permanent residency permit, the ability to maintain a living (also referring to 16 year olds since 2007), sufficient German language skills and knowledge about German social and legal order as well as living conditions in Germany (to be proved in a language test), not having committed any serious criminal offence, commitment to the German constitution and – generally – to give up the former citizenship. New requirements were implemented in the name of internal security, which we will return to below.

The distinct increase of naturalisations during the late 1990s was due to the growing numbers in naturalisations of Turkish migrants. In the past their applications were bound to long waiting periods since they had to have been released from their Turkish citizenship, which only occurred with a considerable delay. Another main group were *(Spät-)*Aussiedler mainly from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The liberalisation of the citizenship law did not in fact lead to a significant increase of naturalisation figures. Instead, from 2000 onwards naturalisation figures have steadily decreased, as table 1 shows. In 2008 – one year after the introduction of a language test – figures fell below 95,000. In particular, fewer migrants from countries with a Muslim majority became naturalised. With regard to naturalised persons who formerly held Turkish citizenship, figures declined from 103,900 (1999), 82,861 (2000) to 28,861 (2007), with Afghan citizenship from 4,773 (2000) to 2,831 (2007) and with Iranian citizenship from 14,410 (2000) to 3,121 (2007).
It is estimated that today there are about 700,000 Germans with Turkish descent living in Germany,\(^6\) compared to about 1.7 Mio Turkish citizens.

Table 1: Naturalisations in Germany, 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Naturalisations (^7)</th>
<th>Ratio of naturalisations compared to foreigners’ population (%)</th>
<th>Percentage of naturalisations involving double citizenship (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>101,377</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>179,904</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>259,170</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>302,830</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>283,604</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>186,688</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>178,098</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>154,547</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>140,731</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>127,153</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>117,241</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>124,566</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>113,030</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>94,470</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>1,236,524</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Statistical Office 2008

One explanation for the decline of figures is the large number of people the law amendment subsequently made eligible for naturalisation, who then became naturalised in the early 2000s. Other reasons leading to a decline in applicants may be found in a feeling of disillusionment among migrants with the final version of the citizenship law, and an atmosphere of distrust or hostility against Muslims evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, fuelled by debates on ‘parallel lives’ (see also WP 2) or the introduction of a ‘Muslim citizenship test’ in Baden Wuerttemberg (see below).

The spokesperson from the TGD describes the experience of exclusion and the unwelcoming atmosphere as the cause of lower aspirations when appealing for naturalisation.

“People are feeling that although they make a real effort to get German citizenship, everything being done in terms of legal amendments does not correspond with that. Instead, people have the feeling, they don’t want us, we aren’t welcome here. Some also say, if I have German citizenship nothing will change. Legally I’m on equal terms but socially I’ll never be on the same footing. I will always be treated like Hassan and Ali and even German citizenship won’t protect me from that. If I also have to give up my Turkish citizenship, why would I want to do that?” (I.6: 7)

The representative of SPD ve biz points to the aforementioned harsh campaign in Hesse against the allowance of double citizenship (1998) that led to widespread resignation among migrants: “People have started to lose hope in German politics.”

The following analysis of new stipulations within the citizenship law, the recently introduced citizenship tests, as well as the recent changes in the immigration law indicates a general


\(^7\) Including (Spät-)Aussiedler.
suspicion against (Muslim) migrants as a threat of inner security and the reluctance to accept especially the quantitative most relevant group of migrants from Turkey and their descendants as equal citizens.

Internal Security

First, the new Citizenship Law has introduced requirements for naturalisation in the name of inner security that, in effect, reduce Muslim resident’s chances of being successful applicants. Reasons for a refusal of a naturalisation, as in 1999 introduced into the Citizenship Law, are „real indications“ that „legitimise the assumption, that the applicant follows or supports attempts directed against the German constitution“. In contrast to former legislation not only concrete facts, but mere indications of an assumption are regarded as sufficient to reject an application.

On the 9th of November 2001, against the background of the terrorist attacks in the USA, the Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat) agreed on a decision to ask the government to amend a naturalisation directive so that in advance of any naturalisation, inquiries must be made about the applicant (at age 16 or older) at the Federal Intelligence Service. Formerly, it was the prerogative of the Länder whether they made inquiries at the Intelligence Service. This amendment was not adopted on the Federal level simply because in the meantime all Länder had already introduced the respective regulation. In fact, in Bavaria this has been already practice since 1998. In Bavaria applicants are asked about any affiliations with organisations under observation by the Bavarian Intelligence Service, this refers to legal Islamic organisations but also, for instance, the political Left party (Die Linke) and other legal organisations.

On the 4th and 5th of May 2006 the Standing Conference of Ministers of the Interior agreed that in addition to the general enquiries made with the Intelligence Service the applicant will be asked if she or he is a member of an extremist organisation, or an organisation influenced by extremists, or if she or he has conducted any activities supporting these organisations.

There is evidence that in the aftermath of 9/11 this new legislation has been increasingly used to deny naturalisation applications of Muslims (Schiffauer 2006). The refusals are legitimised not only with the membership in outlawed organisations, but even the affiliation with legal organisations under observation by the Federal Intelligence Service. In some cases authorities

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8 Art. 11 (1), StAG (2009).
10 Bundestagsdrucksache 14/7903 (18.12.2001), Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke und der Fraktion der PDS, Drucksache 14/7740, Regelanfrage beim Verfassungsschutz in Einbürgerungsfällen.
even withdrew the German citizenship of already naturalised members of such organisations (ibid.).

Selectivity of double citizenship

Second, the principle of disallowing multiple citizenship predominately affects people of Turkish citizenship. Despite the general refusal of multiple citizenship there are – and already have been before 2000 – several bilateral agreements or tacit conventions to (reciprocally) allow multiple citizenship. According to the law transforming the EU-directives on citizenship\textsuperscript{14} in effect since August 2007, double citizenship is accepted in the case of EU-citizens, as well as in the case of citizens of countries that do not release them from their citizenship,\textsuperscript{15} and some other specific exceptions. Between 2000 and 2008 about 46.5 per cent of all naturalisations have been conceded accepting multiple citizenship (see table 1), the main group being German (Spät-)Aussiedler who keep their other citizenship.

The main group to which these exceptions do not refer are those of Turkish descent. This became clear in early 2000 when thousands of Turkish migrants applied for their re-approval of their Turkish passports after being naturalised. As a consequence, these people not only had their German citizenship withdrawn, they also lost their permanent residence status, for which they were forced to re-apply.\textsuperscript{16} The fact that migrants from Turkey or second generation migrants had been denied double citizenship and not even automatically approved their former residency caused huge discontent among Turkish migrants. They felt that the principle of not allowing double citizenship was directly targeted against them (I.3, I.6).

Despite contrary recommendations of several experts in a parliamentary hearing on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of December 2007, the government confirmed the obligation to opt for a single citizenship at the age of 23, denied the extension of double citizenship, and agreed on further stipulations in the requirements of naturalisation, in particular the introduction of a language and citizenship test.\textsuperscript{17}

The fact that double citizenship is not allowed, as well as the disappointment with the aforementioned decisions by the authorities, certainly contribute to the reluctance among Turkish citizens in Germany in applying for German passports. In this process they feel discriminated against in comparison to other foreigners. With respect to Turks in NRW Sauer (2007) shows that the denial of double citizenship is a main reason for not applying for German citizenship (ibid. 102ff, 109ff). 55.5 % of the respondents declared the emotional affiliation to the Turkish citizenship as reason for not applying.

\textsuperscript{14} Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union am 28. August 2007 (Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz), BGBl I 2007 Nr. 42.
\textsuperscript{15} In 2007 this referred to Afghanistan, Algeria, Eritrea, Iran, Cuba, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/4543 (07.03.2007), Antwort auf Kleine Anfrage der Bundestagsabgeordneten Sevim Dagdelen, Ulla Jelpke und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Drucksache 16/4330, Entwicklung der Einbürgerungszahlen, p. 9.
Apart from more emotional reasons, some very practical reasons determine why people do not want to give up their original passports, for example, when people maintain their transnational family and/or professional links and need – temporary – permission to work and reside in their country of origin. For instance, when one has to look after sick relatives in the country of origin the duration of stay abroad may be unforeseeable.

As the spokesperson from the TGD puts it – with reference to a film addressing Italians in NRW to naturalise:

“It says, you’ve been here for a long time, please accept German citizenship, you don’t have to give up yours. This is conceived as an incentive. In our case it is a question of loyalty, either you’re German or you’re not. They argue differently regarding Italians and other ethnic groups. Some are welcomed, others are not, whether they’re occidental or not, this is what it’s about.” (I.6: 7)

Similar, the chair of from the SPD ve biz argues:

“When someone speaks good German, earns their own money, and has been living here for years – are we afraid that they still have bonds with their home country? With Italians, Greeks and so on this is irrelevant, but when it comes to the Turks. (…) One has to call this a deficit in democracy. (…) Double citizenship would be the modern way to build trust.” (I.3: 2)

The Citizenship test

The implementation of a nationwide citizenship test in September 2008, as well as its predecessors in some Länder since 2006, reflect the notion in the German debate that integration and its final achievement of German citizenship points to something beyond formal rights of participation or the commitment to the constitution, but is “about the feeling of belonging” and the commitment to the values underlying the constitution (Schiffauer 2007; see also Peter forthc.).

This idea was strongly reflected in the debate about German Leitkultur as sketched in WP 1. While in the meantime the concept of Leitkultur is less frequently referred to18, today it seems to be generally accepted that it is legitimate to be sceptical about the true accordance of Muslim migrants to the principles of the constitution. Migrants, increasingly codified as Muslims, are depicted as either involuntarily caught up in or deliberately favouring a backward, pre-enlightenment, patriarchal Islamic culture. A fairly obvious example of this idea is the citizenship test in Baden-Württemberg, especially in its first version from January 2006, which quite explicitly infers that Muslim applicants do not sharing the norms and values of German society. The questions were particularly focussed on whether Muslim applicants would agree with what is described as a liberal democratic gender regime (e.g.: “Do you think that it is acceptable to keep one’s daughter at home, in order to avoid her breaking rules of honour?” or “Imagine your son declares being homosexual and wants to live with another man – how would you react?“19. A second main issue was the suspicion that applicants were a threat to security (e.g. “You get to know that people from your neighbourhood, friends or acquaintances have committed a terrorist attack or are planning to. What would you do?”20 The test had been broadly criticised, but the critique primarily

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18 Probably, it is considered as too much linked with a static, ethno-national and backward attitude.
19 http://de.wikibooks.org/wiki/Lehrbuch_Einb%C3%BCrgerungstest_Baden-W%C3%BCrttemberg
20 Ibid.
targeted the test’s methodology, the idea itself of revealing what Muslims think about liberal (gender) norms and democratic order was less a part of the discussion (Schiffauer forthc.; Amir-Moazami 2009).

The nationwide citizenship test is regarded being more matter-of-fact. In total 310 questions, of which 10 refer to the specific Land, dealing with the topical fields in the curriculum of the naturalisation course: “Life in democracy, history and responsibility, human being and society.” The test has been criticised by several organisations as being partly incorrect, unclear or too difficult to understand. One central Muslim organisation (Zentralrat der Muslime) appreciated the test in general but criticised that some questions were “ideologically biased”. Maria Böhmer (CDU), Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery and Federal Government, Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (in the following: Commissioner for Migration) declared the questions would only test the applicants’ knowledge about Germany’s politics and society. This would make migrants into “mature citizens who know their rights and duties”.

Some of the questions, in fact, reveal the underlying aim of testing the ‘real’ appropriateness of (Muslim) migrants becoming part of the nation. Although they do not openly target an allegedly Islamic way of thinking, they implicitly reify Islamic beliefs as a potential threat to security and/or the democratic order and liberal gender relations:

“Which right is part of the basic rights in Germany? The right to possess a weapon / The right of the strongest / Freedom of opinion / Self-administered justice. (…) What is allowed in national and federal elections in Germany? A husband votes for his wife / Postal vote / Voting by telephone / Children 14 years and older are allowed to vote. (…) Which of the following statements is part of the German law? Smoking on the street is not allowed. / Women must wear skirts. / Beating children is not allowed. / Women are not allowed to drink alcohol.” (Gesamtkatalog 2008: nos. 4, 133, 242)

A further example – which presumes on the one side that applicants favour polygamy and on the other side construes a German ‘normalcy’ as liberal about a variety of ways of living, in particular to same sex partnerships – is the question “Which way of living is not allowed in Germany?” with the possible answers: “Man and woman are divorced and live together with new partners. / Two women live together. / A single father lives together with his two children./ A man is married to two women at the same time.” (ibid.: no. 272)

Moreover, the test quite explicitly reifies the idea of the prevalence or even exclusive relevance of Christianity in German and European culture. Only allowing choosing one (i.e. the second) of the given answers, it asks:

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21 For questions regarding, for instance, the colour/emblems of federal flags, or the institutions of the political system – it is disputable if this compound of knowledge proves anything regarding the modes of integration or the readiness for becoming German citizen. The method of multiple choice testing presupposes that the applicants are used to formalised, standardised way of learning.
22 The act of naturalisations is a matter of Länder authorities.
“Which religion has shaped European and German culture? Hinduism / Christianity / Buddhism / Islam”. (ibid.: no. 295)

What Amir-Moazami writes with regard to the implications of the German Islam Conference test, also holds true for the national citizenship test, that “(...) the process of requiring identification with the values behind the law (...) precisely (uncovers) the non-neutral, i.e. ethical character of the constitutional principles themselves. The demand to also subscribe to an ethical substance of the constitutional principles, indeed, unveils itself the particularity of allegedly universal constitutional norms.” (Amir-Moazami 2009: 10)

**Two forms of German citizenship?**

The change in Immigration Law in July 2007 confirms the impression of unequal treatment of naturalised (Turkish) migrants and native German citizens. Referring to regulations of reunion of spouses the amendment introduced the differentiation between Germans born in Germany with single citizenship and individuals with double citizenship or those having lived abroad for a longer period and being naturalised as Germans. Before the amendment spouses could join their partners in Germany if they were German citizens irrespective of their living conditions (Immigration Law, § 28). This has changed according to the guidelines provided by the Federal Ministry of the Interior: “Upon evidence of particular circumstances of individuals who are not able to maintain a living, it must be considered whether a family unification abroad, rather than in Germany, is “just and reasonable”. “Particular circumstances” are those when the German spouse holds double citizenship – then the couple is supposed to live together in the country of the second citizenship – or if the German has lived a “fairly long time” in the country of origin of the spouse, has worked there and speaks the language.”

This restriction most significantly affects German-Turks. It caused massive critique on the side of migrant associations, criticising that “ethnic differentiation” is being made between “Helga and Horst” and “Ahmed and Ayse”. This criticism has been dismissed by the Federal Integration Commissioner Maria Böhmer (CDU) as being a “phantom” concern. In our interview the spokesman of SPD ve biz speaks of “two categories of German citizens” and asks how this discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity was consistent with the constitutional principal of equality (I.3). In fact, these amendments question the validity or robustness of German citizenship when it comes to naturalised migrants.

**Administration and Campaigning**

Finally, the question if and why naturalisation applications have been denied in practice would need further investigation. The question had been made the issue of parliamentary...
inquiries instigated by the Left Party in 2007 and 2008, but could not be answered by the
government as information on applications, length of procedures and reasons for refusals are
not regularly documented.\textsuperscript{30}

The often dismissive or deterrent attitude of German authorities towards migrants has been
criticised by some policy makers.\textsuperscript{31} The National Integrations Plan targets the intercultural
opening of authorities and several initiatives on the local level have the aim of educating
‘intercultural competence’ within public administrative bodies. In our interview the
spokesperson for Integration and Migration of the Liberal Democrats claims that in order to
really encourage naturalisations, a “friendly atmosphere” was needed:

“No, unfortunately, we have a too reluctant way of thinking in Germany. That will be of
no advantage to us. I’m of the opinion it is a question of making it appealing.” (I.1: 1)

For example, the German language skill requirements have to be dealt with in a more flexible
manner:

“(…) in cases where language skills are not sufficient, although the people live here
without any ifs and buts, are also employed, and have no means to go elsewhere, are
rooted here – then there are grounds for giving them secure residence status (here:
citizenship, FM).” (I.1: 2)

Several L\text{"a}nder, partly in cooperation with charities, have launched naturalisation campaigns
and disseminated brochures, poster series and slogans, saying for instance “Get naturalised,
Bremen wants you!” or “The German passport has many faces” (Berlin) or “Naturalisation is
cool” or “Naturalisation is a/your right” (NRW), and underlining the right and legitimacy of
migrants to participate and to have equal rights.\textsuperscript{32} In fact, the Berlin campaign resulted in an
increase in naturalisation figures.\textsuperscript{33}

Until now, the Federal Government campaign has barely been recognisable in the public
realm. In contrast to the L\text{"a}nder campaigns it appears far less appealing or enthusiastic, being
rather more neutral, informative, even reluctant (for instance, a poster showing a child with a
naturalisation certificate, the text saying, “Getting naturalised – how do I become a German
citizen?”)\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the message transmitted through material from the Federal Ministry of
the Interior stresses the principle of single loyalty and does not depict cultural diversity as
being something desirable. The Federal Ministry of the Interior illustrates its website
information on naturalisation requirements by showing the German flag with the motto “100

\textsuperscript{30} See Bundestagsdrucksache 16/9265 (26.05.2008). In her study on the “subjective dimensions of the process of
naturalisation” Wunderlich (2005) reports on the experiences of her 26 respondents (10 of which naturalised
after 2000) with administrations that were predominately positive. This result is certainly partly due to the fact
that the author only interviewed successful applicants.

\textsuperscript{31} See e.g. „NRW fordert Einbürgerungskampagne“, Tagesspiegel, 11.08.2007.

\textsuperscript{32} See for Berlin http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/passt_mir.html. Another Berlin example is the slogan “PASSt
mir” meaning “Fits me”, which is a word game with the word for “passport”. For Bremen see
http://www.soziales.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=bremen69.c.6602.de&font=0; for NRW
http://www.landtag.nrw.de/portal/WWW/Webmaster/GB_II/II.1/Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/Informationen.jsp?oid=
91932 and http://www.einbuergern.de; for Hamburg http://www.hamburg.de/pressearchiv-fhh/1330438/2009-
03-31-bsg-integrationsbeirat.html.

\textsuperscript{33} See Bundestagsdrucksache 16/9265 (26.05.2008).

\textsuperscript{34} See for Berlin http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/passt_mir.html. Another Berlin example is the slogan “PASSt
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http://www.soziales.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=bremen69.c.6602.de&font=0; for NRW
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91932 and http://www.einbuergern.de; for Hamburg http://www.hamburg.de/pressearchiv-fhh/1330438/2009-
03-31-bsg-integrationsbeirat.html.
at home (zu Hause)” neglecting the idea of multiple belongings – even on the emotional level as the notion of zu Hause indicates.  

1.2 Local Franchise

The debates on local franchise for Third Country Nationals (TCNs) illustrate the dominant view that full formal political participation (voting rights) is linked with German citizenship that can only be acquired at the end of a successful integration process. Migrant organisations have been campaigning for the introduction of local franchise as a means of integration for decades, arguing that to deny full rights to all members of society is a violation of democratic principles. Several initiatives attempting to introduce this right from left wing parties have failed.

In February 1989, two Länder amended legislation in order to introduce voting rights on the municipal level. With an appeal initiated by the Conservative parliamentary party, on October 31, 1990, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany judged these amendments to be unconstitutional. The court argued that the Basic Law, when it states that for districts and municipalities “the people” must be represented by election, “the people” only means German citizens (Art. 20 (2), GG) (Isensee and Schmidt-Jortzig 1999). This very restricted interpretation of the people or the constituency does not take into consideration changes in society through migration that were certainly not foreseeable when the Basic Law was drawn up in 1949. The argument has been repeated by the opponents of local voting rights by TCNs ever since. While the proponents of local voting rights demand to change the Basic Law – precondition being that two thirds of the members of both chambers, Bundestag and Bundesrat, would agree – their opponents argue that even the change of the article on local franchise (Art. 28, GG) would conflict the constitution. In fact, the legal debate is not detachable from political standpoints. With respect to EU-foreigners the “unchangeable fundamental constitutional principle” (Art. 79 (3), GG) of the Basic Law has been proved to be non-binding. In December 1992 in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the legislator introduced franchise on the municipal level for EU-citizens.

In 1998 the governmental coalition between Social Democrats and the Greens agreed on the introduction of voting rights for TCNs on the local level but failed because of resistance from the Conservative majority in the Bundesrat. In September 2007, the Länder Rhineland-Palatinate and Berlin took another initiative to introduce local franchise for foreigners. In July 2007 the Left Party fraction requested allowing residents from non-EU countries to vote in local elections, and in October 2007 the Green Party fraction in the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) proposed a legal bill with the same notion, but both to no avail.

As an example of the unwillingness to accept the reality of an immigration country we quote the expert statement by the judge Prof Klaus Rennert for parliamentary debate:

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36 See also Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
38 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/5904 (04.07.2007); Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/6628 (10.10.2007).
“There is no way around it: State authority is derived from the German citizenry. Thereupon rests our constitutional order. The proposals presented aim to replace the people of German citizenry with a differently circumscribed constituency. This contradicts the Basic Law; it is also not approvable by means of a constitutional amendment.” (Rennert 2008: 9)

The apparent fear of a “differently circumscribed constituency” is linked with the opinion that non-German residents were not integrated and would therefore “endanger democracy” when guaranteed German citizenship (ibid.).

In the parliamentary debate Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU) follows this line of argument and depicts a quasi unreachable goal of “integration” by underlining the necessary “success” of it three times:

“The acquisition of German citizenship can always only stand at the end of a successful, felicitous succeeded integration process (Italic by FM)” (Stephan Mayer, CDU/CSU, Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 12543f).

By way of circular argument he explains that because German citizenship and voting rights can never be a means of integration, the introduction of local franchise would not lead to better integration but just the opposite, to “worse integration”. Furthermore, by reifying the stereotype of migrants clinging to ‘parallel societies’ he explains, “there would be no incentive for foreigners living in Germany to strive towards German citizenship (…) This would lead to reinforcement and increasing entrenchment and consolidation of the already existing parallel societies.” (ibid.: 12544).

Mayer finally displays the secondary relevance he assigns to the issue of political participation by saying, “In Germany, particularly in the area of integration, we certainly have other problems we should address, rather than debating the introduction of local franchise for foreigners.” (ibid.: 12544f)

Similarly, Hartfrid Wolff, spokesperson for Foreigners’ Law from the Liberal Democrats’ Fraction, emphasises that the acquisition of German citizenship “can and must stand at the end of the integration process.’”(Hartfrid Wolff, FDP, Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 12545).

Moreover, he quite clearly illustrates his view on non-German citizens he considers unwilling to integrate:

“To grant local franchise without differentiation to people who are in no way integrated into our society because they are mentally, linguistically and perhaps also economically, not only not prepared to live in this society, but who even do not want to be prepared – this cannot meet with our approval.” (ibid.)

The last quite tentative initiative with regard to local franchise for TCNs was taken by the federal government as part of its self-commitments within the National Intergration Plan. In 2008 the BMI evaluated the likelihood of introducing local franchise for non-EU-foreigners. The result of this evaluation as revealed in the progress report (2008) follows the argument of the Constitutional Court: the introduction of local franchise for non-EU-foreigners prerequisites the amendment of the Constitution which requires a majority of two thirds of the members of Bundestag and Bundesrat. Still, the government would not take the initiative and campaign for a parliamentary majority, but states, “In the light of these conditions the consensus of all political parties would be needed. Such a consensus is not foreseeable at the moment.” (Bundesregierung 2008: 4f (Themenfeld 9))
The spokesperson of SPD ve biz summarises that the German government has missed a chance of integration and participation:

“As somebody who loves his country, and I mean Germany, this really does hurt. If the Constitutional Court had decided differently, than one could have started 15-20 years ago. Participation on the local level is very important, to build bridges (...). We would be far further today. (...) It would have been good for Germany: One builds bridges, speaks with each other, and is dependent on each other. There is no bigger drive and power for integration than political participation. This chance has been missed.” (I.3: 3)

As outlined regarding national franchise, also regarding local franchise the different treatment of EU-foreigners and non-EU-foreigners with the majority of migrants from Turkish descent in Germany contributes to the experience of discrimination of this particular group and the exclusion from migrants from political participation. The SPD ve biz representative quite plainly demands equal rights for Turkish residents for the sake of democratic principles:

“As also for reasons of justice (...): How can that be that after being here for 30 years Turks are not allowed to vote, and Portuguese, Italians and so on after half a year? This is quite simply not fair.” (I.3: 3)

In this way the disassociation of Turks in Germany from mainstream society would become all the more entrenched.

1.3 Voter participation and levels of political interest among migrants

As became clear in the chapters above there are a significant number of migrants excluded from national and local franchise. This may be one reason why both research and the interest shown by political parties in the voting preferences of residents with a migration background has been low in the past. In fact, it is difficult to identify voting preferences of residents with a migration background compared to native Germans, since regular surveys on voting behaviour data do not gather data on ethnic or migrant origin. Recently however, some surveys have been made on the political interest and voting preferences of migrants which lead to the following conclusions.

First, migrants without German citizenship show significantly low levels of interest in German politics – although still 15 % of the migrants without the right to vote show a (very) strong interest in German politics (Diehl and Urbahn 1998). Political interest is stronger among the group of naturalised Germans – more than a quarter show significant levels of interest – but still lower than among native Germans (about 50 %) (Wüst 2003).39

Differentiating the group of ‘new citizens’ analysed by Wüst – mainly composed of ethnic

39 Wüst (2002, 2003, 2006) has analysed the composition of ‘new citizens’ and their voting preferences: In 1999 he conducted an inquiry among almost 1,000 individuals who had been naturalised or accepted as (Spät-)Aussiedler between 1.1.1988 and 31.12.1997 in a town in Baden Württemberg (Heidelberg); second, Wüst analysed the results of a monthly poll (Politbarometer) of 1999 and 2001/2002. In 1999 the Politbarometer – a telephone survey regularly carried out among eligible voters since 1977 – has been supplemented by the filter of whether the interviewee has held German citizenship since birth and makes further queries in order to identify ‘new citizens’ (Neubürger), see also Wüst/Heinz 2009.
Germans (Spät-)Aussiedler from CIS, Poland and Rumania as well as residents with Turkish origin – another interesting result emerges: Those who have been excluded from voting rights for a long time show more interest than (Spät-)Aussiedler who were guaranteed German citizenship upon arrival. Of all ‘new citizens’ those from the former Soviet Union are the least interested in politics, while Turkish Germans account for the highest number of politically interested citizens (Wüst 2003).

To summarise, on one hand the exclusion from voting rights seems to reduce the interest in German politics while on the other, the experience of discrimination contributes to growing political interest among those who are eventually granted German passports.

Second, voter participation among naturalised Germans seems quite similar to the participation levels among native Germans (for regional studies see Sauer 2001, 2007; Klinger 2001). According to the nationwide Politbarometer40 87 % of native Germans and 82 % of naturalised Germans said they intended to take part in national elections in 2002 (Wüst 2003: 6). Differentiation according to former citizenship and age modifies the picture: Among Turkish-Germans and Russian-Germans voting participation accounted for about 78 %, among those from Rumania 88 % (ibid.). The share of those planning to vote was significantly higher among those ‘new citizens’ older than 50 than among those younger than 40 (ibid.). This evidence correlates with the high percentage of voters from Rumania – a relatively old group of migrants (ibid.: 7).

Third, voting preferences and long-term party affiliation strongly correlate with the traditional political standpoints of the parties regarding (Spät-)Aussiedler, migrant workers and asylum seekers. Very roughly, in the past CDU/CSU and Liberal Democrats rejected integration policies for non-Aussiedler-migrants in general, but pro-actively supported the immigration and integration of Aussiedler. In addition, the “Christian” orientation of the Conservatives (CDU/CSU) constituted a barrier to Muslims. Social Democrats have always had a strong affiliation with trade unions and took some interest in the social rights of guest workers and refugees, they also favoured Aussiedler migration until the end the 1980s but did not push the issue. The Green Party also campaigned for equal rights, lobbied for asylum seekers, and criticised the Aussiedler policies as ethno-national.

Hence, it is not surprising that 60 % of Turkish-Germans cannot imagine voting for CDU/CSU, while 63 % of Rumanian-Germans would not vote for the Social Democrats (Politbarometer, Wüst 2003: 8). In 2006 out of all interviewed residents of Turkish origin (with and without German citizenship) in NRW 47.9 % would ballot SPD in the next Land election, 4.7 % CDU, 8.4 % Greens, 0.9 % FDP, 3.0 % Left Party, 0.3 % another party, 12 % would not vote, 21.2 % did not know (Sauer 2007: 161). Among naturalised Turks these results are even more significant: 52.2 % would vote SPD (Sauer 2007: 163).

A calculation exercise of looking at the intended votes by people of Turkish descent as real votes show a large potential for representational change, especially regarding the percentages won by the two main parties – hence, once again, the undemocratic element of excluding TCNs from elections: 74 % of the residents of Turkish background, but only 36 % of the native Germans would vote for SPD; 7 % of the first group and 38 % of the second for CDU (Sauer 2007: 166).

Certainly, political preferences of migrants – as those of non-migrants – differ according to social status, gender, age, ethnic origin and individual biographies. Further, clear-cut affiliations may be challenged through the shift in integration policies over the last decade.

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40 See footnote 39.
Preferences may switch as the profiles of political parties change, especially that of the CDU, now being a precursor in implementing new forms of dialogue, the National Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference, although still representing restrictive migration policies.
We will turn to the role of political parties and to individual political activists with a migrant background in chapter 4.

2 Institutionalised forms of participation and consultation

As a result of migrant’s demands, Foreign Citizens’ Advisory Councils were implemented in many German cities. They constituted the only way for non-German immigrants to have any kind of participation in institutionalised or formal politics, but have always been contentious since the extent of their power and influence is limited.
More recent forms of institutionalised involvement of migrants into policies – primarily concerning integration – are round tables, integration councils and the National Integration Summit.

2.1 The Role of Foreign Citizens’ Advisory Councils and Integration Councils

In the 1970s several West-German municipalities introduced so called Foreign Citizens’ Advisory Councils (FCACs – Ausländerbeiräte). Residents with a foreign passport were entitled to elect a board from their own ranks that advise the municipalities regarding issues that especially concern ‘foreigners’ and articulate ‘foreigners’ interests.41 The municipal FCACs organise themselves in State Working Collectives (Landesarbeitsgemeinschaften), on the Länder level, which since 1998 have also joined the federal level.42 According to its self-portrayal, the Federal Foreigners’ Advisory Council (Bundesausländerbeirat) serves as a contact organisation for the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), and the Federal Assembly (Bundesrat), counselling on any issue regarding “foreigners”. Meanwhile, many FCACs have transformed into so-called Integration Councils.

While the number of FCACs has increased since then, their political relevance seems to have diminished. It is estimated that today there are a total of about 400 FCACs in 12 of the 16 Länder.43 Some Länder prescribe the implementation of a FCAC when a certain percentage of ‘foreigners’ in the resident population is reached (Hoffmann 2002: 64, also on the following). In contrast, voting participation in FCACs is declining from around 20% in the early 1990s to about 8 to 10% on average in 2001 (in some big cities to 3-5%) and this even in those Länder (Hesse and Rhineland Palatinate) with the strongest tradition of FCACs (Hoffmann 2002: 64), in 2004 in NRW participation was between 2% and 32% (LAGA 2004: 4). Also the number of candidates standing for election in the FCACs has declined over the last few years. For instance, in 2001 in Hesse 33 FCACs and in NRW 31 FCACs could not be elected mainly as a result of lack of candidates (Hoffmann 2002: 64).

42 Bundesausländerbeirat, Wir über uns, in: 
www.bundesauslaenderbeirat.de/Selbstdarstellung/selbstdarstellung_der_Bab.htm.
43 Ibid.
The role of FCACs is not only contentious in the light of the decreasing voting participation. The main critique refers to some very concrete shortcomings of the institution itself; in particular its lack of authority in local government, a low level of acknowledgement of the boards by German politicians, missing information and public relations on its existence in the migrant communities, and a low level of professionalism among FCACs. The relevance of FCACs has declined even more, because opportunities for participation in the political system have – at least for certain migrant groups – increased, in particular for EU-citizens eligible for local franchise since 1992. Furthermore, due to increasing durations of residence the number of migrants eligible for naturalisation has grown. Naturalised migrants normally lose their franchise in the FCACs. Finally, social, ethnic and national heterogeneity among migrants has increased compared to the first generation of guest workers. In the past, due to stronger social networks, many migrants deemed the support of FCACs to be an act of solidarity, while candidates’ lists were organised according to national background. Today, many migrants identify much less with such an institution and the scope of issues relevant for migrants and their descendants has broadened while the significance of national origin for political participation is diminishing.

The declining interest in FCACs has been interpreted as part of a ‘normalisation’ of migrants and their political interest and a reasonable turning away from particular, national-bound orientation (see Hoffmann 2002; Puskeppeleit and Thränhardt 1990). Meanwhile several cities and Länder have implemented Integration Advisory Councils. The idea behind these boards is that the reduced representation of FCACs will be replaced by the more wholistic and integral approach of integration. In these councils various representatives engage migrants and – in fact, in the majority – non-migrants who are committed to the issue of integration politics.

For example the Berlin Land Advisory Council for Integration and Migration Issues (Landesbeirat für Integrations- und Migrationsfragen), founded in 2003, consists of state secretaries, representatives of Berlin districts, of associations, trade unions and other NGOs and “as the council’s basis” six elected members of migrant organisations. Migrant representatives are elected from 109 different migrant associations. They are assigned to six previously determined regions of origin (i.e.: European Union, Europe outside the EU, Turkey, Near and Middle East incl. Pakistan and India, Far East, Africa, South-, Middle- and North-America and one position without regional classification). The Council meets three or four times a year as a permanent round table. Among other things it has made a recommendation to the Berlin Senate to launch legislative initiatives to introduce franchise for TCNs on the municipal level.

Despite its partly representative structure and choice of topics, such an Integration Council, can only be understood as political representation of migrants in a very limited way. Integration Councils open up the issues of ‘integration’ to (nearly) all interested activists, regardless of whether they are a migrant or not. But they do not open up the opportunity for political participation to all migrants, regardless the topic.

44 NRW and Hesse have introduced the right to stand for election in FCACs for Germans with a migrant background.
47 Only 27.3 % of migrants of Turkish descent in NRW feel (partly) represented by integration councils, which is slightly more than by German parties (or 24.9 %) but less than by Turkish organisations (32 %) or trade unions (28.8 %), Sauer 2007: 153.
The experts interviewed for this study – all coming from a more or less left wing or liberal background – confirmed the critique, for instance naming the FCACs “toothless tigers” (I.2: 4), “absurd or meaningless” (I.3: 4) or an “alibi” (I.4: 3). The spokesperson from the TGD criticised their missing competences, even regarding the FCACs as a way of pacifying migrants:

“When it comes to Advisory Councils one cannot speak of participation (…). They have been allowed to debate something and make recommendations. These weren’t in any way binding. The migrants were supposed to debate some topics among themselves and get the feeling that they were included. (I.6: 3)

The spokesperson for integration and migration from the Liberal Democrats’ Fraction formed her opinion on the basis of her own experience in municipal local government with a FCAC and as member of an Integration Council. She criticises missing competences and commitments of individual candidates, of cronyism in the process of setting up the lists of candidates as well as the retarding effect “this state institution” has on members of the board who are really committed activists (I.1: 2).

On the other hand for some migrants the FCACs appeared to be “a first step in the beginning” (I.2: 4, similar I.4) and a form of political education:

“There are still some Advisory Councils that function well (…) because people come and deal with certain topics. They get something out of it personally (…). In that sense it is (…) a possibility to educate oneself or to investigate different social issues.” (I.6: 3)

Hoffmann (2002) asks whether political representation ‘as migrants’ is still legitimate or necessary and quite convincingly argues that as long as discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or migrant status occurs, political action against this discrimination is necessary. Therefore, the only ‘migrant’ specific issue is that concerning anti-discrimination policies (see also Aksit 2004).

The interviewed experts agreed on the opinion that advisory councils cannot replace political participation. All argued in favour of topical involvement in local politics, participation in the local parliaments, topic specific committees – and of course, through voting rights.

Another important institution acting as an interceder of migrants rights are the Foreigners’ Commissioners – today called Integration Commissioners, the first one being established in 1978 in NRW. Foreigners’ Commissioners act on the local, Länder and national level as advocates for migrant interests. Regardless of the merits of many of the Commissioners, this institution reflects more of a paternalistic or patronising attitude from German authorities towards migrants rather than a means of political representation; especially since they are normally held by a German who has no migration background themselves whatsoever. According to Hoffmann (2002), in some cases this institution seems to have hindered political participation. In some municipalities the office of the Commissioner emerged out of the office of the FCAC. In some cases the Commissioner even impeded the foundation of an FCAC in the same municipality; quite seldom have both institutions successfully cooperated (ibid., 67).
2.2 The National Integration Summit

In July 2006 the German chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) invited migrant organisations and representatives of other relevant social groups to join the federal Länder and local authorities to take part in the first National Integration Summit (NIS). This was the first governmental initiative in German immigration history that aimed to involve migrants in an institutionalised debate. Participants were selected and invited by the government and assigned to working groups to discuss “how to move forward with the integration of migrants”. On the second summit, in July 2007, the results of the working groups – the National Integration Plan (NIP) – were presented: a list of more than 400 measures and voluntary commitments relating to integration adopted by the various participants. On the third summit, in November 2008, the government presented the progress of the implementation of the NIP (Progress Report 2008).

The declared underlying principles of the Integration Summit were, first, a “dialogue with migrants – talking with them, not about them” and, second, “demanding commitment from each participant, because everyone can contribute to the success of integration.”

Out of the ten “topical fields” of the NIP the topic “strengthening integration through civic commitment and equal participation”, comes closest to the topic of political participation, which itself is barely an issue of the plan. Focus is laid on active membership in (migrant) organisations and other “fields of social commitment” (NIP: 173).

Only two of the self-commitments by the government (BMI) directly refer to citizenship or voting rights, the first, on local franchise already mentioned before (see chapter 1.2) had hardly any consequences. The second commitment contends a meanwhile realised facilitation of naturalisation from the acquisition of “particular integration merits” on the side of the applicant, in particular through successfully completing an integration course (Bundesregierung 2008: 4f (Themenfeld 9)).

Even if the NIS does not put voting rights and the opportunity of formal political participation in the centre of its activities, one may see the institution of the NIS itself as a new form of fostering (political) participation and dialogue.

The people interviewed for this study generally appreciated the NIS as a decisive step, at least on a symbolic level. On the other hand, the ambivalence of parallel legislation restrictions was criticised (I.2, I.3, I.6). Leaving the more detailed critique concerning the contents and targets of the NIP aside, we would like to focus on the institution of the NIS as a forum for participation.

The symbolic character of the NIS and the limits of an open dialogue became visible when, in the run-up to the second Summit in 2007, the selection of issues for the NIS agenda, or better: the exemption of certain topics from it, caused a serious conflict. In summer 2007 the legislator passed the amendment of the Immigration Law including the requirement for new immigrants of non-EU-countries, with the exception of e.g. USA, Australia or Japan, of basic German language skills; the introduction of a minimum age of 18 for immigrating family

50 Flyer „Integration – a central task of society“.
51 See e.g. I.1: 7/8, I.4: 4/5.
members; and the aforementioned regulation of family unification that discriminates non-Germany born Germans compared to native Germans.

The fact that this amendment had not been part of the Integration Summit and that migrant organisations had not been explicitly involved in the amendment process was sharply criticised by several migrant associations and other organisations. The associations argued that there was a discrepancy between the governmental use of rhetoric and symbolic integration policies, and its simultaneous restrictive actions. To underline their protest the representatives of four Turkish and/or Islamic organisations declared to boycott the NIS if the government would not announce the withdrawal of the amendment. In the end three organisations took part in the boycott.

The chair of the TGD, Kenan Kolat, claimed that the regulations regarding non-native Germans in the law in particular, were in fact ethnically discriminating. He explicitly referred to democratic principles, saying the boycott was a “call for democracy” and referred to the prominent role model of the former chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD), by recalling his appeal during the Cold War to “dare more democracy” (ibid faz.net). The spokesman of the Turkish-Islamic umbrella organisation DITIB (Dachverband Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religionen e.V.), Bekir Alboga, wished for a “real dialogue” (ibid.).

In response Chancellor Merkel declared “One cannot simply give the government an ultimatum”.\(^{52}\) She referred to the European requirements met by the amendments of the Immigration Law. At the same time she indicated her desire to be a generous host at the summit by repeating her invitation, saying “my hand is outstretched” (ibid.).

The Federal Integration Commissioner Böhmer (CDU) responded that one should not only pay heed to “those with the loudest voices” and the integration process should not be dominated by the “Turkish-Islamic question”. That Kolat was “chasing a phantom”, “all Germans” are to be treated equally, irrespective if they were called “Mohammed or Hans”. Böhmer said the reactions were “blown out of all proportion, both in the use of language and on the merits of the issue”.\(^{53}\) She insisted, “We don’t talk about migrants but with them”, thus accusing the boycotting organisations of making this principle impossible.

Through its reactions the government accused the representatives of not behaving according to democratic rules and of lacking maturity saying that they had excluded themselves from the entire integration and dialogue process with their behaviour. Their position appears even more illegitimate when it is emphasised that, in contrast, other organisations were still wanting to participate. The media explicitly quoted individuals of Turkish origin who criticised the protests as “over blown”.\(^{54}\) In sum, the boycott and the critique of the Immigration Law was depicted as being totally out of place.

The content of the critique itself that there was a discrepancy between the rhetoric of dialogue and the factual (non)-involvement of migrants in important issues was not actually responded to by the government on its merits.

In the end, the boycotting organisations made assurances that they would fulfil their NIP commitments despite their boycott. In the meantime they have resumed active participation in the NIS.

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\(^{52}\) „Der Regierung stellt man keine Ultimaten,” faz.net, 12.07.2007.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., „Boykott sorgt für Ärger“, Tagesspiegel, 12.07.2007.
In retrospect, both parties – the government and the boycotting associations – stress the positive outcome of the whole NIS process. In an interview for this study a member of the office of the Federal Integration Commissioner hints to the joint statement of 17 migrant organisations from 2008 in which the organisations show that “Migrant organisations have had no actual critique of the plan as it now stands, in fact, quite the contrary, it is perceived as being a very positive process.” (I.5: 7) In fact, while the statement reads positively and sounds very approving, migrant organisations also reiterated their critique of the restrictions in the Immigration Law as well as the ongoing disadvantages faced by migrants in Germany (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft 2008).

Regarding the incident in 2007 the member of the office of the Integration Commissioner underlines that migrant organisations had in fact been involved in the regular legislative enactment procedure for the amendment of the immigration law during the hearing in the Committee for the Interior. It was the Federal Governments deliberate decision to separate the discussions around legal amendments to the Aliens Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) from the work on the National Integration Plan:

“It is also a fact that legal aspects were in principal separated from NIP debates because in the view of the Federal Government, they had taken place within the legislation procedure (…) Now, one could say that this is a problem, which it certainly was from the viewpoint of migrant organisations and many others, the trade unions and charity organisations (…). But one could of course also say that the National Integration Plan as a process could focus on socio-political issues upon which there is a high level of agreement among the federal government, the Länder, the municipalities, non-governmental organisations. It was not that difficult to reach agreement on a problem analysis, targets and approaches in these working groups with representatives from both the state and non-state organisations at one table. If one had introduced this very conflict-ridden legislative enactment procedure or specific legal questions into this process, it may have affected the outcome in the end.” (I.5: 7)

The state strategy and the retrospective reasoning by the member of the office of the Integration Commissioner show that the dialogue between the state and migrants is far from being equal and open as long as one side – the state – sets the agenda and guides the general outcome. The explanation for laying the ground for a common strategy regarding integration policies shows that the way of involving migrants and the mode of participation is limited to those targets that foster the integration process in the sense of language acquisition, educational and labour market participation.

The retrospective narrative of the incident by a spokesperson from the TGD reads differently. Similar to Kolat, the interviewee refers to democratic rules and behaviour and the common target of “avoiding mistakes”. He focuses on formal aspects of the involvement of migrant organisation in legislative procedure as well as to the constructive potential of such an involvement (I.6: 4). Nevertheless, the deputy chair of the TGD deems the debate around the boycott as a sign of new strength in migrant associations:

“Now, the Integration Summit has brought with it, the expectation that that in the future they are bound to involve us before the passing of a bill. Because there will be a big row. This is (…) a new quality, a new phase that has now been achieved. Later the

federal government but also the political parties – every time they make a move they have to reckon that migration organisations will be able to assert pressure against it. (…) This calls their credibility into question. (…) One doesn’t want to get into such a situation, so simply out of self-interest they will now be more cautious, and they are already. They are already having to ascertain the general mood and to consider how we should proceed together.” (I.6: 4f)

The organisation refuses to take on the role of upholding a joint, conflict-avoiding strategy that government had assigned it to. It remains to be seen whether the spokesperson’s assessment holds true: that in the future the government will involve migrant organisations more intensively than in the scope of regular legislative procedure – particularly when it comes to more contentious legislative procedures.

The incident reflects a struggle about the power to define the rules of dialogue and democratic behaviour, the governmental attempt to educate migrant organisations and the (tentative) insistence of migrant representatives that may prove themselves to be legitimate and equal partners.56

The agenda and the ways of setting NIP agenda reveal that the ‘dialogue’ is far from being “equal” and open. Instead, it becomes obvious that the government pursues a certain ‘integration project’. Those who deviate from the rules set out by the government are to be educated and disciplined, even, or especially if they insist on being listened to as political migrant representatives (see also Amir-Moazami 2009).

**Future perspectives**

There is broad consensus to somehow continue and institutionalise the NIS, although the future shape of such a forum is still under debate. Migrant organisations would like to see a Federal Advisory Council following the examples of Advisory Councils in Hamburg or Berlin with a representative structure. This suggestion has already been declined by the Integration Commissioner Böhmer. She declared to remain with the “hitherto principle of talking directly with the migrants”.57 This wording rather suggests that Böhmer wants to continue following the principle that the government decides upon the selection of their migrant partners, despite the fact that direct conversation would also be possible if there were elected representatives. The Chancellor aims to include more issue-related committees with representatives of various social groups.58 In response to the suggestion of topical committees, the TGD spokesperson expressed the desire for a combination of a federal representative structure and a subdivision according to topical areas as the Chancellor proposed (I.6).

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56 In summer 2008 another conflict arose in a similar line of argument when Böhmer declined an invitation by the TGD after being criticised by a representative of the TBB (Turkish Community Berlin Brandenburg). See „Integrationsministerin sagt Türken ab“, taz, 19.06.2008; Interview I.6.

57 Quotation according to „Böhmer lehnt Forderung nach einem Bundesausländerbeirat ab“, dradio.de, 27.10.2008, [http://www.dradio.de/nachrichten/200810272100/4](http://www.dradio.de/nachrichten/200810272100/4)

58 “Merkel sieht Nachholbedarf bei CDU”, 06.11.2008, Focus online, [http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/integrationsgipfel-merkel-sieht-nachholbedarf-bei-cdu_aid_346699.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/integrationsgipfel-merkel-sieht-nachholbedarf-bei-cdu_aid_346699.html). A proposal made by the MP Laurischk (FDP) is to establish an board of enquiry within the Federal Parliament, in order to have a permanent institution in the Bundestag instead of an extra Summit, and herewith to give the issue of integration its required attention (I.1: 5)
Examining possible models of a Federal Council entails further questions as discussed above (chapter 2.1). It would need profound competences and support to avoid falling into an “alibi” role and to really have influence on processes of agenda-setting and decision-making.

### 3 Civic commitment and direct avenues for making claims

Another option for articulating political opinion beyond voting is the civic commitment in organisations or by direct forms of making claims.59

Very generally, migrants – here the group of Turkish origin is in the centre of most surveys – seem to involve themselves less frequently in civic activities, and are less frequently organised in political parties and associations than native Germans. Their participation in trade unions is declining and their interest in German politics is below average (Geiss et al. 2006; Cyrus 2005; Halm and Sauer 2004; Wüst 2002). After all, naturalised Turks seem to be more active in non-conventional (collecting signatures, demonstrations) and conventional forms (activities in political parties) of making claims than native Germans or Germans form the CIS (Wüst 2002: 171), evidence that may correspond to the fact that focus of migrants’ political interest often concerns their country of origin. Nevertheless, migrants generally agree with the democratic principles and basic values; their accordance was even higher than that of native Germans (von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 2001: 7/8). Compared to other European countries, migrant organisations in Germany have been a relatively weak political force, as a potential organisational basis of collective interest and opinion formation, in the articulation of issues, and in being able to exercise influence (Koopmans and Statham 1999; also Jungk 2003).

Over the last decades the structure and orientation of migrant organisation has diversified. In the 1960s and 1970s migrant organisations started creating ethnically homogenous workers’ and cultural associations or political exile organisations. Especially during the 1980s more and more organisations were founded as a way of struggling for emancipation, several professionalized themselves, and the scope of activities increased: parents’, women’s, youth or professional organisations developed and also the number of ethnically diverse organisations increased (MASSKS 1999; Fijalkowski and Gillmeister 1997).

Regarding the relevance of membership in ‘ethnic’ or ‘German’ organisations Koopmans et al. (2004) show that among migrants of Turkish, Italian and CIS-background in Germany, participation in an ‘ethnic organisation’ does not exclude the participation in ‘German organisations’. Based on their empirical study they conclude that membership in an ‘ethnic organisation’ does not negatively or positively influence political participation, while membership in German organisations positively correlates with political participation (Koopmans et al. 2004) Further, political participation in Germany as well transnational activities in the country of origin are by no means mutually exclusive. (ibid.)

Beside the fact that migrants are free to become members in associations or trade unions60, participate in civic activities, have the right to voice their opinions and demand their rights the

59 In this paper we do not refer to interventions in the political discourse by individuals, an important issue which would need further investigation, especially the regarding question of who is listened to, when and why – like, for instance, in the case of Necla Kelek who criticises ‘Turkish parallel societies’ as well as traditional migrant organisations and who has been pushed onto the foreground by media and German politicians (see WP 2). Also the role of legal court cases initiated by individuals, e.g. to implement minority rights or protection from discrimination, as (indirect) forms of political intervention, has to be left aside.
opportunity structure for their civic commitment was long ago coined by the general, and at the same time, exclusionary and paternalistic notion of migration policies. Moreover, migrants are subject to certain legislation regarding associating and political activities.

The German Law on Associations (Vereinsrecht 1964, last amendment 2007) defines special rules regarding so-called foreigners’ associations (Ausländervereine), which are defined as associations whose members or chairpersons are primarily foreigners. Foreigners’ associations can more easily be forbidden than associations of Germans. The reasons for prohibition have been differentiated and enlarged in the course of the so-called Law to Combat Terrorism enforced after 9/11. Since the abolition of the “privilege of religion” (Religionsprivileg) these stipulations also refer to religious groups. Similarly, political activities of individual foreigners may be constrained or prohibited according to the Immigration Law.

In the period of ‘guest worker’ recruitment of the 1960s and 1970s charity organisations developed a state-subsidised system of ‘foreigners’ social work’, which left little space for migrant organisations to organise themselves independently (Puskeppeleit and Thränhardt 1990). Moreover, migrant workers’ organisations were often suspected of being communist, while the nationalist organisation ‘Grey Wolves’ (Graue Wölfe) served as proof of a general mistrust towards migrant self-run organisations, especially political ones (Cyrus 2005; Ernst Klee 1972, acc. to Caglar 2003). Since the late 1990s and especially after 9/11 Turkish or Arabic migrant organisations, especially Muslim ones, are increasingly suspected of being Islamic fundamentalist or being in contact with fundamentalists (see Schiffauer 2006).

Financial and institutional support for migrant self-run organisations has been quite low, although it has improved, e.g. with the NRW support programme for migrant organisations from 1996 (see MASSKS 1999). Gaitanides (2006) draws a comparison between the financial support of migrant organisations in the city of Essen in 2000 – which in relation to other German cities supports migrant organisations above average – with the London East-End district Islington in 1996. Both administrations supported about 100 migrant or minority organisations: In Essen the total accounted for 100,000 DM and in Islington about – converted – 3 Mio DM through which qualified personnel could be employed (ibid. 35).

Meanwhile politicians have begun to acknowledge the bridging and integrating effects of migrant organisations (e.g. in the NIP). This acknowledgment partly corresponds to a general (neo-liberal) enhancement of civic commitment, and partly to the principle of “Fördern und Fordern” (to fund and to make demands), which ascribes a great part of responsibility for their integration to the migrants. The NIS has put the professionalization of migrant organisations on the agenda, one central target is to qualify these organisations as provider of Youth Volunteer Services; the government has announced additional funds to support community oriented projects of migrant organisations (Progress Report 2008), although the degree and standards of such measures are still to be improved (I.4).

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60 Foreigners have been allowed to run for office in work councils since 1972 (see WP 4). Refugees are constrained in their scope of (political) activities as they have to fulfil certain residence obligations.


63 Aufenthaltsgesetz § 47.

4 Immigrants in Political Parties, as Candidates and Deputies

‘Foreigners’ (persons without German citizenship) may become political party members – with the exception of the Bavarian CSU, while the CDU requires a one-year waiting period.65 There is no statistical data on the percentage of members with migration backgrounds in German political parties. Spokespeople from the respective parties confirmed that while there are currently no plans to collect data about the migration background of their members, they themselves estimated the percentage to be quite low, while the Green Party estimated a somewhat higher proportion. According to representative studies, less than one per cent of migrants from the former main ‘guest worker’ sending countries were members of a political party (see Cyrus 2005; Diehl and Urbahn 1998). In comparison, out of all eligible voters in Germany about 4 % belong to a political party (Alemann 2003).

According to the German electoral system half of a total of about 600 members in the Bundestag are elected by direct vote on a first-past-the-post-basis, the second half is elected via lists of candidates put forward by the parties in the 16 Länder (proportional representation). Hence, each voter may cast two votes, the first one for one of the candidates in their constituency, the second one for the party lists in the federal state concerned. The seats are distributed among the parties in proportion to their second vote results – the precondition being that they have to have polled at least five per cent of all second votes or won at least three constituency seats on the basis of the first votes. Most Länder elections follow this electoral system. The majority of the municipal governments are elected in a personalised proportional representation system (voters have three votes, or as many votes as members of the municipal body to be elected). 66 The candidates listed on ballot sheets are elected by the delegates of their respective parties. Figures on migrant candidates are also difficult to collect. Based on data from the Federal Elections Office, Fonseca (2006a, 2006b) has generated a database providing socio-structural data on “Immigrant Candidates”, defined as either first generation immigrants whose place of birth was outside Germany, or “second or later generation immigrant candidates” – the method of identifying the second group is vague and questionable, namely “by their distinctive surnames and, in some cases, by news reports or webpage information on their immigrant background.” (Fonseca 2006a: 18)

The percentage of immigrants among all candidates only slightly increased between 1998 and 2002 from 1.6 to 1.7 per cent, while their total numbers even declined (1998: 82; 1998: 59; 2005: 77). In 1998 most of the candidates (44 %) came from Eastern Europe and the CIS, declining to 25 % in 2002, while the proportion of candidates from Turkey and the Near East rose from 42 % (1998) to 57 % (2002) (Fonseca 2006b: 34). While CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP only listed about one per cent immigrants among all of their candidates, Greens and Left Party listed three to four per cent. In 1998 and 2002 there were three, in 2002 there were seven immigrant candidates without party affiliation, which suggests that migrant politicians do not find their place easily within the political parties (Fonseca 2006a: 26).67

The share of ‘first generation migrants’ among the total of 2,346 candidates standing for national elections in 2005 was 2.9 % (67 candidates)68 of whom 13 immigrated as (Spät-

67 ‘Non-party’ constituency nominations must have the support of at least 200 persons entitled to vote in the constituency concerned.
68 Another 40 were German refugees or expellees. Towards the end and in the aftermath of World War II about twelve million German nationals fled and were expelled from the former eastern territories of Germany and from areas once occupied by the Nazis across Europe to the western and central areas of Germany, later the Allied
Aussiedler from Romania, Poland, the Soviet Union resp. the CIS, 21 came from the countries of ‘guest worker’-recruitment (esp. Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey), and 33 from other countries (Wüst 2006: 232). In total the Left Party listed the most migrant candidates (20), the CSU/CDU the fewest (9) (see table 2). The majority of migrant candidates in the Green Party were from ‘guest worker’ sending countries (5), respectively from Turkey (4), or other countries (6), only one having immigrated as an (Spät-)Aussiedler. The Liberal Democrat’s (FDP) ballot lists mainly held migrant candidates from other countries (12), in particular France (2), the USA (2) and from the Near East (3). The majority of the candidates born in Turkey are listed by the Left Party (8), and the Green Party (5), while the traditional representatives of migrant workers, the SPD, only listed three Turkish migrants, less surprisingly the Conservatives listed only one and the Liberals (FDP) offered no candidates from Turkey (ibid.).

Table 2: First generation migrant candidates standing for national election 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born outside Germany</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German expellees (end of WW II)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic Germans ((Spät-)Aussiedler)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from guest worker recruitment countries</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which from Turkey</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from other countries</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total minus German expellees</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the exception of German refugees and expellees and Aussiedler, parliamentary representation of migrants in Germany is relatively new and still quantitatively low. In 1987 the first politician of Turkish origin, Sevim Celibi, became member of one of the regional German Parliaments (Land Berlin), affiliated with the Green Party. In 1989 the first Turkish-German politician was elected into the European Parliament (Leyla Onur, SPD), in 1994 Cem Özdemir (Green Party) was the first politician from a Turkish migrant family to be elected into German Federal Government (Kiyak 2007: 25). In 2007 there were about 80 deputies of Turkish origin in German parliaments (ibid. 23), compared to 2,5 Mill. residents of Turkish background or an estimated 700,000 Germans of Turkish origin.

Currently in German Parliament (2005-2009) there are eleven deputies with a migration background, seven of whom are first generation migrants, and four of whom are second generation migrants (Wüst 2006; see table 3.). There are quite possibly other deputies from the second generation – especially the descendants of Aussiedler – whose migration background is not publicly known. The proportion of MPs with a migration background is

Occupation Zones in Germany and Austria. Since the end of the expulsion in the early 1950s ethnic Germans from these countries have immigrated as Aussiedler, since 1993 the official term is Spätaussiedler. Although, despite certain difficulties with integration, the social and political position of German refugees and expellees in West Germany (including their own political party and a Federal Minister for the Affairs of the Expellees until the 1969) was distinctively better than that of subsequent migrant groups, which is why we neglect this group in our analysis. They were most frequently listed by the Left Party (14) and accounted for 50 % of all CDU/CSU migrant candidates (9), see also table 2, Wüst (2006).

69 On party preferences of migrants see also above, chapter 1.3.
70 See footnote 68.
71 See footnote 68.
72 In addition, there were five German MPs who were born abroad who are not regularly considered to be migrants.
generally very low (1.8 % of a total of 612 MPs), their proportion is higher in the Left Party (5.6 % of 53 MPs) and the Green Party (7.8 % of 51 MPs); their share of SPD-MPs is only 1.4 %; of CDU/CSU-MPs 0.4 % while none of the FDP fraction members have a migration background.

Table 3: Deputies with migration background in German Federal Parliament (2005-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>MPs with a migration background</th>
<th>Names (migration generation, country of origin)</th>
<th>Percentage of MPs of the party</th>
<th>Total of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Michaela Noll (2nd generation, Iran)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lale Akgün (1st generation, Turkey)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Josip Juratovic (1st generation, Yugoslavia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sebastian Edathy (2nd generation, India)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ekin Deligöz (1st generation, Turkey)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jerzy Montag (1st generation, Poland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Omid Nouripour (1st generation, Iran)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Josef P. Winkler (2nd generation, India)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hüseyin-Kenan Aydin (1st generation, Turkey)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hakki Keskin (1st generation, Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sevim Dagdelen (2nd generation, Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wüst 2006: 233

Barriers and Incentives

The main parties are now increasingly trying to appeal to migrant voters in election campaigns through their choice of images and topics (e.g. I.2). Nevertheless, it seems that the political parties are only slowly considering proactively attracting more migrants as voters, members, or candidates – given the fact that numbers of naturalised migrants are increasing. The spokesperson for integration and migration from the FDP explained: “It is even more difficult to understand the German political system for residents with a migration background than it is for native Germans.” (I.1: 3). But only in being animated by the interview did she consider implementing the intercultural opening up of political parties to migrants as a part of the self-commitments within the National Integration Plan (I.1). The SPD-referent admitted that the SPD was still far away from its targets regarding “intercultural opening”; saying that although some ideas are being debated, they are not currently at the centre of their political work. These ideas involve the possibility of offering mentoring programs for migrants, or approaching migrants in their first language in order to show some courtesy (I.2: 5).

Based on the initiative of migrant members, nearly every party has established a working group, committee or network of Turkish/migrant members within or affiliated with the party: Immi-Grün within the Green Party, the Federation of Turkish Social-Democrats on the European level as well as local networks74 within or close to the SPD, Liberal Turkish-German Union75 affiliated with the FDP, and the German-Turkish Union as a “platform” of

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73 Including two deputies without a political fraction.
75 Liberale Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung, http://ltd-ev.de/
the CDU. The groups function as forums for migrant members as well as intermediaries between the migrant community and the party.

One quite successful example is the SPD network *SPD ve biz* in the Land Baden Wuerttemberg. It aims to mobilise residents with a Turkish (or other migrant) background into becoming politically active. Decisively supported by the chair of the SPD in Baden Wuerttemberg the network evolved from the 2002 national election campaign when SPD-activists tried to mobilise people with a migration background to support the local native German SPD-candidate. Since then they have won about 300 new members. One of the initiators of the network depicts himself as a “door opener” for local associations and regional sections of the SPD, facilitating communication between these organisations and interested young people from migrant families (I.3).

The desire of migrant party members to organise as migrants apparently differs across the political parties. The working group from the Green Party no longer seems to be active, presumably since migrant issues, as well as migrants themselves, are quite well integrated in the party. For example, among other things, the son of Turkish ‘guest worker’ family, Cem Özdemir, was elected in November 2008 to hold one of the two chairs of the Federal Party. On the other hand, the German-Turkish Union and its predecessors have had difficulties in being accepted as part of the party by the CDU, and at the same time have been criticised by other migrants as being too restrictive towards immigration or too close to rightwing Turkish organisations. Meanwhile, it is a “platform within the CDU” supported by prominent CDU-members, apparently as they acknowledge its potential to attract migrant voters and to transmit conservative integration policies. Still, migrants within the conservative party clearly have difficulty gaining higher positions within party hierarchy or in getting on to election lists (see below).

Beyond the organisations within the parties, there have been some initiatives for politician migrants, the latest of which was the “Network of Deputies of Turkish Background”, a network of about 50 politicians, who first met in April, 2007. It provides a forum for the “exchange of experiences”, and aims to “develop common positions and proposals to improve the integration of migrants of Turkish background” (Kiyak 2007: 11). For well established politicians like Lale Akgün (SPD), member of the Federal Parliament, although member of the network, she said that this kind of forum certainly “does not make that much sense (…), because there is not much consensus with people from the CDU.” (I.2: 6) For other network members, especially on the issue of positions on candidates’ list, the network is an important common one.

In fact, contrary to the assumption that political parties aim to put more immigrant candidates on electoral lists in order to reach to a new migrant citizenry following the amendment of the citizenship law (Fonseca 2006b), migrant politicians are still less likely to be placed on promising positions on election lists. The chair of the Network of Deputies of Turkish

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76 Its website has not been updated since 1999, http://basis.gruene.de/immigruen/.
77 Though, also migrant politicians within the Green Party do face stereotypes and resentments, see below.
Background, Ergun Can (SPD), criticises the “token placements of migrants at the bottom of party lists”. 80

Perhaps the most prominent example of unsuccessfully trying to get a respectful placing on an electoral list, is the CDU-member Bülent Arslan, born in Turkey and living in Germany since 1975. An active party member since 1991, he was member of the CDU-immigration commission and is chair of the German-Turkish Forum in NRW. 81 In 2002 and 2005 he was listed as a Land NRW candidate for the Federal Government elections, but not in a promising position. His impression is that the CDU sometimes prefers “the exotic” Turkish background when there are vacant positions within the party board, but when it comes to the competition for a mandate in parliament “the Turkish origin is often a disadvantage”. 82 He has resigned himself to not campaigning for a position on the electoral list for the federal elections in 2009. 83 He concludes, “The time for Turkish-origin politicians has yet to come.” At the same time he still believes in change: „But there is a lot developing in the moment. I do see changes in my party.”84

Media reports of party meetings on the local level suggest that the acceptance of politicians with a (visible) migrant background is low in nearly all parties. In one case two SPD-members left the local party meeting and returned their membership-books when a member of Turkish origin, Volkan Baran, was elected vice-chair of the assembly. 85 Although the Green Party elected Ekin Deligöz in 1998 to be the first chairperson of Turkish origin and despite since becoming an MP, she says she has had to “fight fiercely” for a promising list position due to internal party “resentments”. 86

Association with migration and integration related topics

Moreover, politicians from a migrant background are still quite strongly associated with certain topics, such as migration, integration, Islam or foreign policies (regarding their or their (grand) parents’ ‘home’ country). This may be a result of individual biographies and politicising processes triggered by experiences of ethnic/racial discrimination. On the other hand it reflects a certain stereotyping – be it the party or the citizenry, native Germans or migrants themselves. At the same time, several counter-examples give reason to suggest that the accepted scope of issues that a ‘migrant politician’ may concern themselves with is growing.

Despite limited data on ethnic or migration background, Wüst (2006) identifies some differences between native German candidates and candidates with a migration background regarding their thematic focus. Beside the fact that both groups clearly prioritise the issue of unemployment, migrant candidates more frequently make social peace, bureaucracy and foreign policies their most important issues. More distinctive differences occur regarding the question of exactly whose concerns a directly elected deputy should focus on. Among the

82 „Gefangene ihrer Herkunft“, Spiegel online, [http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,488122,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,488122,00.html), 12.07.2007.
84 „Gefangene…“, Spiegel online, 12.07.2007.
86 „Gefangene…“, Spiegel online, 12.07.2007.
migrant candidates, 19% declared a “certain social group” as being their first priority compared to 6% of native German candidates. In turn 50% of native Germans and 33% of the migrant candidates declared this to be of least importance (Wüst 2006: 232).

In focal committees concerned with topics somewhat related to migration and integration in the Federal Government, the proportional involvement of MPs with a migration background is significantly higher than that of other MPs, in particular regarding EU policies/foreign affairs and petitions, education, work/employment (and internal affairs). In turn, MPs with a migration history are underrepresented in committees concerning finances and budgets, sciences and technology, environmental issues, agriculture and fishing, energy infrastructure, defence, and health (Wüst and Heinz 2009).

Nevertheless, it seems that tendencially politicians with a migration background are not only enlarging or changing their scopes of interest, but that topical options within the parties are also broadening. For instance, Özdemir’s focal points include finances/economics, education, migration/integration, Europe, Turkey/EU and international politics. Omid Nouripour (Greens, MP since 2006), works on migration and integration issues, and beyond that he is responsible for budget and defence policies.

The interviews show that even successful migrant deputies seem to face stereotypes from within the parties and the media. Lale Akgün (SPD, MP since 2002), born in Turkey and living in Germany since the age of 9, focuses on the issues of Europe, social integration, and Islam (in the sense of equal rights irrespective of religion). As Akgün’s staff member reports Akgün is often referred to by the media as an expert on every issue on Turkey, being asked by party colleagues about what is going in “her country” when they mean Turkey. In some cases her counterparts do not listen to the complexity of her standpoints regarding Turkey as her they assume that she is naturally in favour of Turkey joining the EU. The interviewee says: “The exotic factor – that she still has to fight against her image as some kind of bird of paradise instead of a very normal politician” (I.2: 3) On the other hand, in election campaigns on the ground (non-migrant) people do not seem to make issue of her origins, since they are more interested in issues directly affecting themselves (I.2: 7)

The Green Party ascribed capacities and an interest in integration policies to a politician due to his migration background and the colour of his skin. Josef Winkler (Greens, MP since 2002), who was born in Germany and whose mother comes from India, who is Catholic and a nurse by profession, became spokesman of migration policies of the Green party, although this topic had not been among his main foci of political work before.

Politicians with a migrant background see themselves confronted with the expectation that they will represent the concerns of the ethnic community. Furthermore, migrants with a migration background deal with these expectations and their migrant identity differently. For instance, Cem Özdemir (Greens, MP 1994-2002) identifies himself as a German national of Turkish origin – an attribute he stands by but also calls “accidental”. His Turkish origin gives him the capacity to communicate with Turkish migrants and mediate between them and mainstream discourse. At the same time he is quite critical of Turkey and, for instance, does

87 Alternative possible answers were: the constituency who had elected the candidate, all citizens in the constituency, the voters of the candidate’s party, or all citizens.
88 http://www.nouripour.de/index.php?id=themen
89 http://www.oezdemir.de/index.html.
not believe in Turkish voting rights for third-generation-migrants living in Germany.\(^90\)
Hence he receives both broad acceptance and rejection from the Turkish migrant community (I.4: 8).

The only MP who does not mention her migration background on her website and, in the first instance, is not identifiable as second-generation migrant, is the Conservative Michaela Noll (MP since 2002).\(^91\) Her website includes information about her family, in fact about her husband, but not that her father is an Iranian refugee. One may assume that that she explicitly does not want to be associated with a “migrant identity” or seen as a spokeswoman for migrants. Her political aims confirm this impression: While she stands for equal opportunities for women, and the support of families and seniors on the one side, she demands “maintaining national identity” on the other, which is further explained as: “Germany is an open-minded country. Despite this, immigration must be controlled and restricted – to demand and support integration! To give people a place to call home (Heimat).”\(^92\) Other topics are “internal security, economic growth, and the capacity to act on the municipal level.” (ibid.) Still, one of her fields of practice is fostering integration through sports, in this field she particularly focuses on Muslim girls.\(^93\)

**Conclusion**

Governmental efforts of recent years to improve and foster integration have underexposed the aim of political representation and participation of migrants and their descendants. Despite the decisive liberalisation of citizenship regulations there are still quite restrictive elements which foremost affect migrants from Turkey or more generally from Muslim countries.

The new Citizenship Law has introduced requirements for naturalisation in the name of inner security that generally suspect – apparently esp. Muslim – applicants of disapproving the liberal democratic order. Also the implementation of a nationwide citizenship test, as well as its predecessors in some Länder since 2006, reflect the notion in the German debate that integration and its final achievement of German citizenship points to something beyond formal rights of participation or the commitment to the constitution, but is “about the feeling of belonging” and the commitment to liberal values.

The denial of local franchise for third-country-nationals follows the principle that full formal political participation is linked with German citizenship that can only be acquired at the end of a successful integration process. The denial implies unequal treatment of short-term EU-immigrants compared to in Germany born third-country-nationals. It neglects the educating and integrating effects political participation on the local level have. The legal argument against the local franchise for third-country-nationals ignores the social reality of a citizenry which has changed by immigration.

Advisory councils and integration forums as well as civic commitment may serve as forms of consultation and political education. They certainly have changed the acknowledgment of migrants’ concerns on state level. This should not detract from the pacifying, patronising or


\(^{91}\) Also, second generation migrants Sebastian Edathy and Joseph Winkler, who is the only black MP do not explicitly refer to their families’ migration.

\(^{92}\) http://www.michaela-noll.de/polit_ziele.php

\(^{93}\) Interview with Michaela Noll: „Elterngeld muss bei den Kindern ankommen“, NGZ-online.de, 13.09.2006.
disciplining elements of these institutions. They cannot replace real political participation of migrants as equal citizens.

Politicians from migrant families are still relatively few in numbers, and that the political careers of migrants are hampered by stereotypes and resentments within political parties and by the media. Those few who are successful are still perceived as being something ‘other’, ‘exotic’ – or their ‘normality’ appears arduous. Nevertheless, changes in the way migrant politicians have become increasingly visible and able to represent a diversity of standpoints and (not only ethnic) identities is not to be overlooked, and political parties – to different degree – have begun to confront themselves with the prospect of a new kind of citizenry.

References


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**Interviews**

I.1 Member of Parliament (FDP), Spokesperson for Integration and Migration, Berlin, 11 November 2008

I.2 Member of staff of the Member of Parliament (SPD) and Deputy Spokesperson of the Working Group Migration and Integration within the SPD, Berlin, 9 December 2008

I.3 Head of the Project Group *SPD ve biz* (*SPD und wir*), Baden Wuerttemberg, telephone interview, 19 December 2008

I.4 Member of staff of the Fraction of *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (*Green Party*), Referee for Migration and Refugee Politics, Berlin, 13 January 2009

I.5 Member of staff (head of division) of the Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery and Federal Government, Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, Maria Böhmer, Berlin, 14 November 2008

I.6 Deputy Chair of the Turkish Community in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland* (*TGD*), Berlin, 13 November 2008

**Abbreviations**

Art. Article

BAGIV *Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

BGBl. *Bundesgesetzblatt*

CDU *Christlich Demokratische Union* (*Christian Democratic Union of Germany*)

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

Drs *Drucksache* (*printed matter*)

EU European Union

FDP *Freie Demokratische Partei der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (*Liberal Democrats of the Federal Republic of Germany*)

Greens / Green Party *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*

I. Interview

NGO non-governmental organisation

NRW North Rhine-Westphalia

SPD *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (*Social Democratic Party of Germany*)

StAG *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (*Citizenship Law*)

TBB *Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg*

TGD *Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland* (*Turkish Community in Germany*)

WP Work package